Statue of Gen Patton worth a look!!!
Patton On Communism
And The Khazar Jews
General Patton’s Warning
Edited by Raquel Baranow
At the end of World War II, one of America’s top military leaders accurately assessed the shift in the balance of world power which that war had produced and foresaw the enormous danger of communist aggression against the West. Alone among U.S. leaders he warned that America should act immediately, while her supremacy was unchallengeable, to end that danger. Unfortunately, his warning went unheeded, and he was quickly silenced by a convenient “accident” which took his life.
Thirty-two years ago, in the terrible summer of 1945, the U.S. Army had just completed the destruction of Europe and had set up a government of military occupation amid the ruins to rule the starving Germans and deal out victors’ justice to the vanquished. General George S. Patton, commander of the U.S. Third Army, became military governor of the greater portion of the American occupation zone of Germany.
It was only in the final days of the war and during his tenure as military governor of Germany — after he had gotten to know both the Germans and America’s “gallant Soviet allies” — that Patton’s understanding of the true situation grew and his opinions changed. In his diary and in many letters to his family, friends, various military colleagues, and government officials, he expressed his new understanding and his apprehensions for the future. His diary and his letters were published in 1974 by the Houghton Mifflin Company under the title The Patton Papers.
Several months before the end of the war, General Patton had recognized the fearful danger to the West posed by the Soviet Union, and he had disagreed bitterly with the orders which he had been given to hold back his army and wait for the Red Army to occupy vast stretches of German, Czech, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav territory, which the Americans could have easily taken instead.
On May 7, 1945, just before the German capitulation, Patton had a conference in Austria with U.S. Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Patton was gravely concerned over the Soviet failure to respect the demarcation lines separating the Soviet and American occupation zones. He was also alarmed by plans in Washington for the immediate partial demobilization of the U.S. Army.
Patton said to Patterson: “Let’s keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to the Red Army. This is the only language they understand and respect.”
Patterson replied, “Oh, George, you have been so close to this thing so long, you have lost sight of the big picture.”
“I understand the situation. Their (the Soviet) supply system is inadequate to maintain them in a serious action such as I could put to them. They have chickens in the coop and cattle on the hoof — that’s their supply system. They could probably maintain themselves in the type of fighting I could give them for five days. After that it would make no difference how many million men they have, and if you wanted Moscow I could give it to you. They lived on the land coming down. There is insufficient left for them to maintain themselves going back. Let’s not give them time to build up their supplies. If we do, then . . . we have had a victory over the Germans and disarmed them, but we have failed in the liberation of Europe; we have lost the war!”
Patton’s urgent and prophetic advice went unheeded by Patterson and the other politicians and only served to give warning about Patton’s feelings to the alien conspirators behind the scenes in New York, Washington, and Moscow.
The more he saw of the Soviets, the stronger Patton’s conviction grew that the proper course of action would be to stifle communism then and there, while the chance existed. Later in May 1945 he attended several meetings and social affairs with top Red Army officers, and he evaluated them carefully. He noted in his diary on May 14:
“I have never seen in any army at any time, including the German Imperial Army of 1912, as severe discipline as exists in the Russian army. The officers, with few exceptions, give the appearance of recently civilized Mongolian bandits.”
And Patton’s aide, General Hobart Gay, noted in his own journal for May 14: “Everything they (the Russians) did impressed one with the idea of virility and cruelty.”
Nevertheless, Patton knew that the Americans could whip the Reds then — but perhaps not later. On May 18 he noted in his diary:
“In my opinion, the American Army as it now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because, while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air, tanks, and in the knowledge of the use of the combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these. If it should be necessary to fight the Russians, the sooner we do it the better.”
Two days later he repeated his concern when he wrote his wife: “If we have to fight them, now is the time. From now on we will get weaker and they stronger.”
Having immediately recognized the Soviet danger and urged a course of action which would have freed all of eastern Europe from the communist yoke with the expenditure of far less American blood than was spilled in Korea and Vietnam and would have obviated both those later wars not to mention World War III — Patton next came to appreciate the true nature of the people for whom World War II was fought: the Jews.
Most of the Jews swarming over Germany immediately after the war came from Poland and Russia, and Patton found their personal habits shockingly uncivilized.
He was disgusted by their behavior in the camps for Displaced Persons (DP’s) which the Americans built for them and even more disgusted by the way they behaved when they were housed in German hospitals and private homes. He observed with horror that “these people do not understand toilets and refuse to use them except as repositories for tin cans, garbage, and refuse . . . They decline, where practicable, to use latrines, preferring to relieve themselves on the floor.”
He described in his diary one DP camp,
“where, although room existed, the Jews were crowded together to an appalling extent, and in practically every room there was a pile of garbage in one corner which was also used as a latrine. The Jews were only forced to desist from their nastiness and clean up the mess by the threat of the butt ends of rifles. Of course, I know the expression ‘lost tribes of Israel’ applied to the tribes which disappeared — not to the tribe of Judah from which the current sons of bitches are descended. However, it is my personal opinion that this too is a lost tribe — lost to all decency.”
Patton’s initial impressions of the Jews were not improved when he attended a Jewish religious service at Eisenhower’s insistence. His diary entry for September 17, 1945, reads in part:
“This happened to be the feast of Yom Kippur, so they were all collected in a large, wooden building, which they called a synagogue. It behooved General Eisenhower to make a speech to them. We entered the synagogue, which was packed with the greatest stinking bunch of humanity I have ever seen. When we got about halfway up, the head rabbi, who was dressed in a fur hat similar to that worn by Henry VIII of England and in a surplice heavily embroidered and very filthy, came down and met the General . . . The smell was so terrible that I almost fainted and actually about three hours later lost my lunch as the result of remembering it.”
These experiences and a great many others firmly convinced Patton that the Jews were an especially unsavory variety of creature and hardly deserving of all the official concern the American government was bestowing on them.
Another September diary entry, following a demand from Washington that more German housing be turned over to Jews, summed up his feelings:
“Evidently the virus started by Morgenthau and Baruch of a Semitic revenge against all Germans is still working. Harrison (a U.S. State Department official) and his associates indicate that they feel German civilians should be removed from houses for the purpose of housing Displaced Persons. There are two errors in this assumption. First, when we remove an individual German we punish an individual German, while the punishment is — not intended for the individual but for the race.
Furthermore, it is against my Anglo-Saxon conscience to remove a person from a house, which is a punishment, without due process of law. In the second place, Harrison and his ilk believe that the Displaced Person is a human being, which he is not, and this applies particularly to the Jews, who are lower than animals.”
One of the strongest factors in straightening out General Patton’s thinking on the conquered Germans was the behavior of America’s controlled news media toward them. At a press conference in Regensburg, Germany, on May 8, 1945, immediately after Germany’s surrender, Patton was asked whether he planned to treat captured SS troops differently from other German POW’s. His answer was:
“No. SS means no more in Germany than being a Democrat in America — that is not to be quoted. I mean by that that initially the SS people were special sons of bitches, but as the war progressed they ran out of sons of bitches and then they put anybody in there. Some of the top SS men will be treated as criminals, but there is no reason for trying someone who was drafted into this outfit . . .”
Despite Patton’s request that his remark not be quoted, the press eagerly seized on it, and Jews and their front men in America screamed in outrage over Patton’s comparison of the SS and the Democratic Party as well as over his announced intention of treating most SS prisoners humanely.
With great reluctance, and only after repeated promptings from Eisenhower, he had thrown German families out of their homes to make room for more than a million Jewish DP’s — part of the famous “six million” who had supposedly been gassed — but he balked when ordered to begin blowing up German factories, in accord with the infamous Morgenthau Plan to destroy Germany’s economic basis forever. In his diary he wrote:
“I doubted the expediency of blowing up factories, because the ends for which the factories are being blown up — that is, preventing Germany from preparing for war — can be equally well attained through the destruction of their machinery, while the buildings can be used to house thousands of homeless persons.”
Similarly, he expressed his doubts to his military colleagues about the overwhelming emphasis being placed on the persecution of every German who had formerly been a member of the National Socialist party. In a letter to his wife of September 14, 1945, he said:
“I am frankly opposed to this war criminal stuff. It is not cricket and is Semitic. I am also opposed to sending POW’s to work as slaves in foreign lands (i.e., the Soviet Union’s Gulags), where many will be starved to death.”
Despite his disagreement with official policy, Patton followed the rules laid down by Morgenthau and others back in Washington as closely as his conscience would allow, but he tried to moderate the effect, and this brought him into increasing conflict with Eisenhower and the other politically ambitious generals. In another letter to his wife he commented:
“I have been at Frankfurt for a civil government conference. If what we are doing (to the Germans) is ‘Liberty, then give me death.’ I can’t see how Americans can sink so low. It is Semitic, and I am sure of it.”
And in his diary he noted:,
“Today we received orders . . . in which we were told to give the Jews special accommodations. If for Jews, why not Catholics, Mormons, etc? . . . We are also turning over to the French several hundred thousand prisoners of war to be used as slave labor in France. It is amusing to recall that we fought the Revolution in defense of the rights of man and the Civil War to abolish slavery and have now gone back on both principles.”
His duties as military governor took Patton to all parts of Germany and intimately acquainted him with the German people and their condition. He could not help but compare them with the French, the Italians, the Belgians, and even the British. This comparison gradually forced him to the conclusion that World War II had been fought against the wrong people.
After a visit to ruined Berlin, he wrote his wife on July 21, 1945: “Berlin gave me the blues. We have destroyed what could have been a good race, and we are about to replace them with Mongolian savages. And all Europe will be communist. It’s said that for the first week after they took it (Berlin), all women who ran were shot and those who did not were raped. I could have taken it (instead of the Soviets) had I been allowed.”
This conviction, that the politicians had used him and the U.S. Army for a criminal purpose, grew in the following weeks. During a dinner with French General Alphonse Juin in August, Patton was surprised to find the Frenchman in agreement with him. His diary entry for August 18 quotes Gen. Juin: “It is indeed unfortunate, mon General, that the English and the Americans have destroyed in Europe the only sound country — and I do not mean France. Therefore, the road is now open for the advent of Russian communism.”
Later diary entries and letters to his wife reiterate this same conclusion. On August 31 he wrote: “Actually, the Germans are the only decent people left in Europe. it’s a choice between them and the Russians. I prefer the Germans.” And on September 2: “What we are doing is to destroy the only semi-modern state in Europe, so that Russia can swallow the whole.”
By this time the Morgenthauists and media monopolists had decided that Patton was incorrigible and must be discredited. So they began a non-stop hounding of him in the press, a la Watergate, accusing him of being “soft on Nazis” and continually recalling an incident in which he had slapped a shirker two years previously, during the Sicily campaign. A New York newspaper printed the completely false claim that when Patton had slapped the soldier who was Jewish, he had called him a “yellow-bellied Jew.”
Then, in a press conference on September 22, reporters hatched a scheme to needle Patton into losing his temper and making statements which could be used against him. The scheme worked. The press interpreted one of Patton’s answers to their insistent questions as to why he was not pressing the Nazi-hunt hard enough as: “The Nazi thing is just like a Democrat-Republican fight.” The New York Times headlined this quote, and other papers all across America picked it up.
The unmistakable hatred which had been directed at him during this press conference finally opened Patton’s eyes fully as to what was afoot. In his diary that night lie wrote:
“There is a very apparent Semitic influence in the press. They are trying to do two things: first, implement communism, and second, see that all businessmen of German ancestry and non-Jewish antecedents are thrown out of their jobs.
“They have utterly lost the Anglo-Saxon conception of justice and feel that a man can be kicked out because somebody else says he is a Nazi. They were evidently quite shocked when I told them I would kick nobody out without the successful proof of guilt before a court of law . . .
“Another point which the press harped on was the fact that we were doing too much for the Germans to the detriment of the DP’s, most of whom are Jews. I could not give the answer to that one, because the answer is that, in my opinion and that of most nonpolitical officers, it is vitally necessary for us to build Germany up now as a buffer state against Russia. In fact, I am afraid we have waited too long.”
And in a letter of the same date to his wife: “I will probably be in the headlines before you get this, as the press is trying to quote me as being more interested in restoring order in Germany than in catching Nazis. I can’t tell them the truth that unless we restore Germany we will insure that communism takes America.”
Eisenhower responded immediately to the press outcry against Patton and made the decision to relieve him of his duties as military governor and “kick him upstairs” as the commander of the Fifteenth Army. In a letter to his wife on September 29, Patton indicated that he was, in a way, not unhappy with his new assignment, because “I would like it much better than being a sort of executioner to the best race in Europe.”
On October 22 he wrote a long letter to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, who was back in the States. In the letter Patton bitterly condemned the Morgenthau policy; Eisenhower’s pusillanimous behavior in the face of Jewish demands; the strong pro-Soviet bias in the press; and the politicization, corruption, degradation, and demoralization of the U.S. Army which these things were causing.
He saw the demoralization of the Army as a deliberate goal of America’s enemies:
“I have been just as furious as you at the compilation of lies which the communist and Semitic elements of our government have leveled against me and practically every other commander. In my opinion it is a deliberate attempt to alienate the soldier vote from the commanders, because the communists know that soldiers are not communistic, and they fear what eleven million votes (of veterans) would do.”
In his letter to Harbord, Patton also revealed his own plans to fight those who were destroying the morale and integrity of the Army and endangering America’s future by not opposing the growing Soviet might:
“It is my present thought . . . that when I finish this job, which will be around the first of the year, I shall resign, not retire, because if I retire I will still have a gag in my mouth . . . I should not start a limited counterattack, which would be contrary to my military theories, but should wait until I can start an all- out offensive . . . .”
John Beaty his five years with the Military Intelligence Service in World War II rounded out the background for the reading and research (1946-1951) which resulted in The Iron Curtain Over America.
CAPITALISM BROUGHT TO IT’S KNEES….ANY WONDER?
For evidence, compare the volume entitled Hearings Regarding Communism in the United States Government – Part 2, that record committee proceedings of Aug. 28 and 31, and Sept. 1 and 15, 1950, with the records of comparable inquiries any year from the committee’s origin in 1938 down to 1940 when the present membership took over.
The witnesses who appeared before the committee in these latest hearings need no explaining. They were: Lee Pressman, Abraham George Silverman, Nathan Witt, Charles Kramer, John J. Abt and Max Lowenthal. This handsome galaxy represents the very distilled essence of inside knowledge in matters that can help the people of this Republic understand why we are now wondering where Stalin is going to hit us next.
At least one, Max Lowenthal, is an intimate friend of President Truman, regularly in and out of side entrances at the White House.
Perhaps that accounts — of course it does — for the arrogant assurance with which Lowenthal spot in the committees eye when he was finally brought before it for a few feeble questions.
Incidentally, “Truman was chosen as candidate for Vice President by Sidney Hillman, at the suggestion (according to Jonathan Daniels in his recent book A man of Independence) of Max Lowenthal” . . . (“The Last Phase,” by Edna Lonigan, Human Events, May 2, 1951).
In fairness to the present membership, however, it is well to add that, from a variety of circumstances, the Committee has suffered from a remarkable and continuing turn-over of membership since the convening of the 81st Congress in January, 1949.
New regulations — passed for the purpose by the Democratic 81st Congress, which was elected along with President Truman in 1948 — drove from the Committee two of its most experienced and aggressive members: Mr. Rankin of Mississippi, because he was Chairman of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and Mr. Hebert of Louisiana, because he was not a lawyer.
In January, 1949, the experienced Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota left the House and his membership on the Committee to take his seat in the Senate. Promotion to the Senate (Dec. 1, 1950) likewise cost the Committee the services of Congressman Richard Nixon of California, the member most active in the preliminaries to the trial of Alger Hiss.
In the election of 1950, Representative Francis Case of South Dakota was advanced to the Senate. After a single term on the Committee, Congressman Burr P. Harrison of Virginia became a member of the Ways and Means Committee on Un-American Activities. Thus when the Committee was reconstituted at the opening of the 82nd Congress in January, 1951, only one man, Chairman John S. Wood of Georgia, had had ,more than one full two-year term of service and a majority of the nine members were new.
The Committee, like all others, needs letters of encouragement to offset pressure from pro-Communist elements, but there were evidences in 1951 of its revitalization. On April 1, 1951, it issued a report entitled “The Communist Peace Offensive,” which it described as “the most dangerous hoax ever devised by the international Communist conspiracy” (see Red-ucators in the Communist Peace Offensive, National Council for American Education, 1 Maiden Lane, New York38, N.Y.)
Moreover, in 1951 the committee was again probing the important question of Communism in the motion picture industries at Hollywood, California. Finally, late in 1951 the Un-American Activities Committee issued a “brand new” publication, a “Guide Book to Subversive Organizations,” highly recommended by The Americanism Division, The American Legion (copies may be had from the National Americanism Division, The American Legion, 700 N. Pennsylvania St., Indianapolis, Ind.; 25 cents; in lots of 25 or more, 15 cents. See, also, pp. 101-103, above).
Fortunately, the Senate Judiciary Committee is also accomplishing valuable work in the exposure of the nature and methods of the Communist infiltration. Its work is referred to, its chairman Senator McCarran of Nevada is quoted, and its documents are represented by excerpts here and there in this book.
The Rules Committee of the House was restored to its traditional power by the 82nd Congress in 1951 and may also prove an effective brake on bills for implementing the dangerous policies of an incompetent, poorly advised, or treasonable leadership in the executive departments.
As a last resort, however, a President of the United States or any other member of the Executive or Judicial Branches of the government can be removed by impeachment. Article I, Section 2, paragraph 5; Article I, Section 3, paragraph 6; Article II, Section 4, paragraph 1 of the U.S. Constitution name the circumstances under which, and provide explicitly the means by which, a majority of the representatives and two-thirds of the senators can remove a president who is guilty of “misdemeanors” or shows “inability” to perform the high functions of his office.
Surely some such construction might have been placed upon Mr. Truman’s gross verbal attack (1950) upon the United States Marine Corps, whose members were at the time dying in Korea, or upon his repeated refusal to cooperate with Canada, with Congress, or with the Courts in facing up to the menace of the 43,217 known Communists said by J. Edgar Hoover (AP dispatch, Dallas Times-Herald, February 8, 1950) to be operating in this country, with ten times that many following the Communist line in anti-American propaganda and all of them ready for sabotage in vital areas if the Soviet Union should give the word (AP dispatch Dallas Times-Herald, February 8, 1950).
The matter of President Truman’s unwillingness to move against Communism came to a head with the passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Under the title, “Necessity for Legislation,” the two Houses of Congress found as follows:
(1) There exists a world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-wide Communist organization. . .
(12) The Communist network in the United States is inspired and controlled in large part by foreign agents who are sent into the United States ostensibly as attaches of foreign legations, affiliates of international organizations, members of trading commissions, and in similar capacities, but who use their diplomatic or semi-diplomatic status as a shield behind which to engage in activities prejudicial to the public security.
(13) There are, under our present immigration laws, numerous aliens who have been found to be deportable, many of whom are in the subversive, criminal, or immoral classes who are free to roam the country at will without supervision or control. . .
(15) The Communist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, the recent successes of communist methods in other countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the security of the United States and to the existence of free American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress, in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United States.
A measure for curbing Communism in the United States — prepared in the light of the above preamble — was approved by both Senate and House.
It was then sent to the President. What did he do?
He vetoed it.
Thereupon both Senate and House (September 22, 1950) overrode the President’s veto by far more than the necessary two-thirds majorities, and the internal Security Act became “Public Law 831 — 81st Congress — Second Session.”
The enforcement of the law, of course, became the responsibility of its implacable enemy, the head of the Executive Branch of our government!
But the President’s efforts to block the anti-Communists did not end with that historic veto. “President Truman Thursday rejected a Senate committee’s request for complete files on the State Department’s loyalty-security cases on the ground that it would be clearly contrary to the public interest” (AP dispatch, Washington, April 3, 1952).
To what “public” did Mr. Truman refer? The situation was summed up well by General MacArthur in a speech before a joint session of the Mississippi legislature (March 22, 1952). The general stated that our policy is “leading us toward a communist state with as dreadful certainty as though the leaders of the Kremlin themselves were charting our course.”
In view of his veto of the Internal Security Act and his concealment of security data on government employees from Congressional committees, it is hard to exonerate Mr. Truman from the suspicion of having more concern for leftist votes than for the safety or survival of the United States. Such facts naturally suggest an inquiry into the feasibility of initiating the process of impeachment.
Another possible ground for impeachment might be the President’s apparent violation of the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 11, which vests in Congress the power “To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.” This authority of the Congress has never been effectively questioned. Thus in his “Political Observations” (1795) James Madison wrote “The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests in the Legislature the power of declaring a state of war” (quoted from “Clipping of Note,” No. 38, The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., Irvington-on-Hudson, New York). Subsequent interpreters of our basic State Paper, except perhaps some of those following in the footsteps of Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (Chapter III, above), have concurred.
It was seemingly in an effort to avoid the charge of violating this provision of the Constitution that President Truman, except for a reported occasional slip of the tongue, chose to refer to his commitment of our troops in Korea as a “police action” and not a war. Referring to the possibility of President Truman’s sending four additional divisions to Europe where there was no war, Senator Byrd of Virginia said: “But if by chance he does ignore Congress, Congress has ample room to exercise its authority by the appropriations method and it would be almost grounds for impeachment” (UP dispatch in Washington Times-Herald, March 15, 1951).
The distinguished editor and commentator David Lawrence (U.S. News and World Report, April 20, 1951) also brought up the question of impeachment: If we are to grow technical, Congress, too, has some constitutional rights. It can impeach President Truman not only for carrying on a war in Korea without a declaration of war by Congress, but primarily for failing to let our troops fight the enemy with all the weapons at their command.
The question of President Truman’s violation of the Constitution in the matter of committing our troops in Korea has been raised with overwhelming logic by Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota. Article 43 of the United Nations charter, as the Senator points out, provides that member nations of the UN shall supply armed forces “in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” Thus the starting of the Truman-Acheson war in Korea not only violated the United States Constitution, but completely lacked United Nations authority – until such authority was voted retroactively! (Washington Times-Herald, May 17, 1951; also see Chapter VI, d, above.)
The House in the 81st Congress several times overrode a Truman veto by more than the Constitutional two-thirds vote. Even in that 81st Congress, more than five-sixths of the Senators voted to override the President’s veto of the McCarran-Mundt-Nixon anti-Communist bill, which became Public Law 831.
With the retirement of Mrs. Helen Douglas and other noted administration supporters, and Mr. Vito Marcantonio, the 82nd Congress is probably
even less inclined than the predecessor Congress to tolerate the Truman attitude toward the control of subversives and might not hesitate in a moment of grave national peril to certify to the Senate for possible impeachment for a violation of the Constitution the name of a man so dependent on leftist votes or so sympathetic with alien thought that he sees no menace – merely a “red herring” – in Communism.
With the defeat of such “left of center” men – to use a term which President Franklin Roosevelt applied to himself – as Claude Pepper, Frank Graham, and Glen Taylor and such administration henchmen as Millard Tydings, Scot Lucas, and Francis Myers; with election from the House of new members such as Wallace F. Bennett, John M. Butler, and Herman Welker, the Senate also might not hesitate in a moment of grave national peril to make appropriate steps toward impeachment under the Constitution.
Incidentally, a rereading of the Constitution of the United States is particularly valuable to anyone who is in doubt as to the Supreme importance of Congress, the President, and the Supreme court under the basic law of the land. Whereas the Congress is granted specific authority to remove for cause the President and any other executive or Justice of the Supreme Court, neither the President nor the Supreme Court has any authority whatsoever over the qualifications of the tenure of office of a Senator or Representative.
Good books on the Constitution, both by Thomas James Norton, are The Constitution of the United States, Its Source and Its Application (World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1940) and Undermining The Constitution, A History of Lawless Government (The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1951).
In another valuable book, The Key to Peace ( The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 75 East Wacker Drive, Chicago 1, Illinois), the author, Dean Clarence Manion of Notre Dame Law School, develops the idea that the key to peace is the protection of the individual under our Constitution.
With reference again to impeachment, an examination of the career of other high executives including the Secretary of State might possibly find one or more of them who might require investigation on the suspicion of unconstitutional misdemeanors.
Despite the bitter fruit of Yalta, Mr. Acheson never issued a recantation. He never repudiated his affirmation of lasting fidelity to his beloved friend, Alger Hiss, who was at Yalta as the newly appointed State Department “Director of Special Political Affairs.”
Despite the Chinese attack on our troops in Korea, Mr. Acheson never, to the author’s knowing, admitted the error, if not the treason, of the policy of his department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs down to and including the very year of 1950, when these Chinese Communists, the darlings of the dominant Leftists of our State Department, attacked us in the moment of our victory over the Communists of North Korea.
“What then will you do with the fact that as concerning Soviet Russia, from Yalta to this day, every blunder in American foreign policy has turned out to be what the Kremlin might have wished this country to do?? All you can say is that if there had been a sinister design it would look like this” (The Freeman, June 18, 1951).
General Marshall was at Yalta as Chief of Staff of U.S. Army. According to press reports, he never remembered what he was doing the night before Pearl Harbor. At Yalta, it was not memory but judgment that failed him for he was the Superior Officer who tacitly, if not heartily, approved the military deals along the Elbe and the Yalu — deals which are still threatening to ruin our country.
General Ambassador Marshall not only failed miserably in China; Secretary of State Marshall took no effective steps when a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, according to Senator Ferguson of Michigan, handed him a memorandum stating in part; “It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson. It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity” (INS, Washington Times-Herald, July 24, 1950).
The reference to Acheson was to Undersecretary Acheson, as he then was. Unfortunately in late 1951, when General Marshall ceased to be secretary of Defense, he was replaced by an other man, Robert A. Lovett, who, whatever his personal views, carried nevertheless the stigma of having been Undersecretary of State from July, 1947, to January, 1949 (Congressional Directory, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 365), when our opposition in China was being ruined under the then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall.
The pro-Soviet accomplishments of the high-placed leftists and their dupes in our government are brilliantly summed up by Edna Lonigan in Human Events (Sept. 8, 1948): Our victorious armies halted where Stalin wished. His followers managed Dumbarton Oaks, UN, UNRRA, our Polish and Spanish policies. They gave Manchuria and Northern Korea to Communism. They demoted General Patton and wrote infamous instructions under which General Marshall was sent to China. They dismantled German industry, ran the Nuremberg trials and even sought to dictate our economic policy in Japan. Their greatest victory was the “Morgenthau Plan.”
And the astounding thing is that except for the dead (Roosevelt, Hillman, Hopkins, Winant) and Mr. Morgenthau, and Mr. Hiss, and General Marshall, most of those chiefly responsible for our policy as described above were still in power in June, 1952!
In Solemn truth, do not seven persons share most of the responsibility for establishing the Communist grip on the world? Are not the seven: (1) Marx, the founder of violent Communism; (2) Engels, the promoter of Marx; (3, 4, 5)Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin; (6) Franklin D. Roosevelt, who rescued the tottering Communist empire by recognition (1933), by the resultant financial support, by his refusal to proceed against Communists in the United States, and by the provisions of the Yalta Conference; and (7) Harry S. Truman, who agreed at Potsdam to the destruction of Germany and thereafter followed the Franklin Roosevelt policy of refusing to act against Communists in the United States – the one strong nation which remains as a possible obstacle to Communist world power?
In spite of the consolidation of Stalin’s position in Russia by Franklin Roosevelt and by Stalin’s “liquidation” of millions of anti-Communists in Russia after Roosevelt’s recognition, the Soviet Union in 1937 was stymied in its announced program of world conquest by two road-blocks: Japan in the East and Germany in the West.
These countries, the former the size of California and the latter the size of Texas, were small for great powers, and since their main fears were of the enormous, hostile, and nearby Soviet Union, they did not constitute an actual danger to the United States. The men around Roosevelt, many of them later around Truman, not merely defeated but destroyed the two road-blocks against the spread of Stalinist Communism! Again we come to the question: Should the United States continue to use the men whose stupidity or treason built the Soviet Union into the one great land power of the world?
In continuing to employ people who were in office during the tragic decisions of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, are we not exactly as sensible as a hypothetical couple who employ the same baby sitter who has already killed three of their children?
“By What Faith, Then, Can We Find Hope in Those Whose Past Judgments So Grievously Erred? asked Senator Ecton of Montana on September &, 1951. “Can We Trust the Future to Those Who Betrayed the Past?” asked Senator Jenner of Indiana in a speech in the Senate of the United States on September 19, 1950. Whatever the cause of our State Department’s performances, so tragic for America, in 1945 and thereafter (see also Chapter VI, above), the answer to Senator Jenner’s point blank question is an incontrovertible “No.”
Congressmen, the patriotic elements in the press, and the letter-writing public should continually warn the President, however, that a mere shuffling around of the save old cast of Yalta actors and others “Whose past judgments so grievously erred” will not be sufficient. We must not again have tolerates of extreme leftism, such as Mr. John J. McCloy, who was Assistant Secretary of War from April, 1941, to November, 1945, and Major General Clayton Bissell, who was A.C. of S.G.-2, i.e., the Army’s Chief of Intelligence, from Feb. 5, 1944, “to the end of the war” (Who’s Who in America, 1950-1951, pp. 1798 and 232). In February, 1945, these high officials were questioned by a five-man committee created by the new 79th Congress to investigate charges of communism in the War Department.
In the New York Times of February 28 (article by Lewis Wood), Mr. McCloy is quoted as follows: The facts point to the difficulties of legal theory which are involved in taking the position that mere membership in the Communist party, present or past should exclude a person from the army or a commission. But beyond any questions of legal theory, a study of the question and our experience convinced me that we were not on sound ground in our investigation when we placed emphasis solely on Communist affiliation.
According to some newspapers, Mr. McCloy’s testimony gave the impression that he did not care if 49% of a man’s loyalty was elsewhere provided he was 51% American. The validity of Christ’s “No man can serve two masters” was widely recalled to mind. Edward N. Scheiberling, National Commander of the American Legion, referring to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy’s testimony, stated (New York Times, March 2, 1945): That the Assistant Secretary had testified that the new policy of the armed forces would admit to officer rank persons 49 percent loyal to an alien power, and only 51 percent loyal to the United States.
The Legion head asserted further: Fifty-one percent loyalty is not enough when the security of our country is at stake. . . The lives of our sons, the vital military secrets of our armed forces must not be entrusted to men of divided loyalty.
The Washington Times-Herald took up the cudgels against Mr. McCloy and he was shifted to the World Bank and thence to the post of High Commissioner of Germany (Chapter VI, above). With sufficient documentation to appear convincing, The Freeman as late as August 27, 1951, stated that “Mr. McCloy seems to be getting and accepting a kind of advice that borders on mental disorder.”
General Bissell was moved from A.C. of S., G-2 to U.S. Military Attaché at London. He received, a little later, a bon voyage present of a laudatory feature article in the Communist Daily Worker. Below the accompanying portrait (Daily Worker, June 20, 1947) was the legend “Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, wartime head of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps, who defended Communist soldiers from the attacks of Washington seat-warmers during the war.”
And so, when the Augean stables of our government are cleaned out, we must, in the words of George Washington, “put only Americans on guard.” We must have as secretaries of State and Defense men who will go down through their list of assistant secretaries, counselors. division chiefs, and so on, and remove all persons under any suspicion of Communism whether by ideological expression, association, or what not. While danger stalks the world, we should entrust the destiny of our beloved country to those and only those who can say with no reservation:
“This Is My Own, My Native Land!”
AMERIKAN STATE DEPARTMENT- NOT ONE CHRISTIAN AMERICAN WORKS THERE- KHARZAR JEWS ONLY!!!