Were I Iranian President I’d nuke Israel yesterday- had I any Nuclear weapons- end the NWO for the sake of humanity.
Wargame by the Brain of the US Government, Brookings: How Israeli Airstrike Against Iran Will Pass Off?
Posted by Anders under English, Euromed
LATEST. The Daily Mail 10 Nov. 2011: Sources say the understanding at the top of the British Government is that Israel will attempt to strike against the nuclear sites ‘sooner rather than later’ – with logistical support from the U.S. A senior Foreign Office figure has revealed that ministers have been told to expect Israeli military action, adding: ‘We’re expecting something as early as Christmas, or very early in the new year.’
Summary: On December 14, 2009, the Brookings Institution´s Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. This is an excerpt from Brookings´ report.The following is now more relevant than ever – after the IAEO Report GOV/2011/63 and the rumors of imminent Israeli attacks on Iran. A hypothetical US National Security Council with former mermbers of that council, a hypothetical Israeli well-qualifed government committee and an Iranian hypothtical National Supreme Security Council with more uncertain qualifications participated in the wargame under the surveillance of senior observers. The reactions of Russia and China were not taken into consideration.
1. The game began with all teams receiving reports that a large-scale Israeli strike had already taken place against Iran.Control opted to have Israel not tell the United States before the strike that it would be attacking. We wanted to test a scenario in which Israel gets its fondest wish and does maximum damage to the Iranian targets.
2. The U.S. and Israel teams demonstrated very different approaches to the situation.
3. The U.S. team called for restraint on all sides and was heavily focused on the danger of unintended escalation,but pledged to defend Israel.
4. The Israel team accepted these conditions, at least initially, even while Israel was being hit by missiles from Iran, rockets from Hizballah.
5. Meanwhile, the U.S. team aggressively – but in vain -sought to make contact with the Iran team.
6. The Iran team saw opportunities to weaken Israel and demonstrate that Jerusalem would pay a heavy price for attacking Iran; to weaken the American regional position and undertake attacks on U.S. allies.
7. The Iran team ordered a wide range of actions meant simply to inflict pain on Israel without any larger strategic purpose,and thereby they did cross an American red line. If Israel had left some of the nuclear program intact the Iranian response would have been less dramatic. Besides Iran would mount terrorist attacks in Europe in order to make Europe turn its back on Israel and the US.
8. The Iran team concluded that the fact that many of the Israeli aircraft had traversed Saudi Arabia was proof of Israeli and Saudi collusion.
9. Iran persisted in lobbing small numbers of Shahab-3 ballistic missiles at Israeli targets, assisted by Hezbollah from Lebanon.
10. In response, the Israel team began to pressure the U.S. team – and was allowed to attack Hezbollah – but not Iran
11. Thus, as its final move, the Israel team ordered a fortyeight- hour air and special forces “blitz” against Lebanon – with a more farreaching air and ground attack to follow.
12.The endgame ended with the United States having given up on its efforts to engage Iran, having begun a massive military reinforcement of the Gulf region, and having committed itself (including publicly) to clearing the Strait of Hormuz and protecting Gulf oil exports, by force if necessary. Had the game gone on it would have ended with the destruction of all Iranian air-seaground assets in and around the Strait of Hormuz on top of the loss of its nuclear program.
DEBKAfile 9 Nov. 2011: Most Israelis now suspect that Iran already has the N-bomb but no one responsible is willing to admit it. That should be enough to make Israeli leadership think twice – unless they have an agreement with Iran.
The following is now more relevant than ever – after the IAEO Report GOV/2011/63.
On December 14, 2009, the Brookings Institution´s Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. This is an excerpt from Brookings´ report.
Brookings is a US think said to have been telling the United States Government how to conduct its affairs for the past 70 years – and is still doing so. So one can expect the US to behave as described below in an Israeli attack on Iran. However, the Brookings wargame does not take the reaction of Russia and China into consideration! The maximum damage to Iran´s nuclear project may not be seen – if the information about an undercover agreement between Israel and Iran about an Israeli attack to boost oil prices is correct.
Wargames present a representation of reality and must be tightly controlled to minimize the extent to which they misrepresent real-world events. Having multiple teams in any crisis simulation immediately introduces distortion because the teams and their interaction with each other cannot be modeled to reflect reality perfectly. In the December 14 simulation, Control allowed the U.S. and Israel teams to have extensive interaction. The U.S. and Israel teams were only allowed to communicate with the Iran team indirectly to try to simulate the absence of easy or extensive channels between the two sides.
Those on the U.S. team were highly accomplished former U.S. government personnel, all of whom had participated in National Security Council meetings while in government. All present, including a number of observers from the press, the U.S.government, and Brookings felt that their deliberations closely reflected how an American National Security Council would approach the scenario presented by the simulation. Similarly, those present—including one very senior-level Israeli observer who had participated in Israeli government cabinet-level discussions—felt that the Israel team had successfully modeled the behavior of an actual Israeli cabinet in such a situation. It was impossible for those on our Iran team to know how real Iranian decision-makers would act—or for Control or any of the observers to judge the accuracy of their portrayal. Considerable caution must be applied when suggesting how the results of a simulation ought to shape real-world policy-making decisions.
One team represented a A: hypothetical American National Security Council,a second team represented a B: hypothetical Israeli cabinet, and a third team represented a C: hypothetical Iranian Supreme National Security Council.
1. The game began with all teams receiving reports that a large-scale Israeli strike had already taken place against Iran, motivated by the breakdown of talks between Iran and the P5+1, the failure of the United Nations Security Council to endorse more than symbolic new sanctions against Iran, and the acquisition of highly valuable but highly perishable intelligence information regarding the existence of two secret Iranian nuclear facilities. Control opted to have Israel not tell the United States before the strike that it would be attacking. We wanted to test a scenario in which Israel gets its fondest wish and does maximum damage to the Iranian targets.
At first, many on the U.S. team were outwardly angry that the Israelis had not informed the US. However, during the course of the simulation, members of the U.S. team revealed that had Israel informed the United States of a planned strike, even at the eleventh hour, the United States would have demanded that Israel call it off. Some members of the U.S. team also noted that Israel’s decision not to inform the United States gave Washington the ability to say with complete sincerity that it had not condoned the attack and had not even been notified—positions that later became very important to the American strategy.
Because two successive American administrations have made it clear that they do not want Israel to strike Iran, Washington should not assume that it will be notified if Jerusalem makes the decision to do sodespite American opposition.
2. Right from the start, the U.S. and Israel teams demonstrated very different approaches to the situation—the aftermath of a successful Israeli airstrike—which created tremendous tension between them throughout the simulation. The Israel team believed (and hoped to convince the U.S. team) that Israel’s strike had created a terrific opportunity for the West to pressure Iran, weaken it, and possibly even undermine the regime. The U.S. team, conversely, felt that Israel had opened a potential Pandora’s Box and it was vital that they (the Americans) get it closed as quickly as possibly. U.S. team told themthat they had made a mess and should go sit in the corner and not do anything else while the United States cleaned it up.
3. The U.S. team called for restraint on all sides and was heavily focused on the danger of unintended escalation, not wanting the United States to be dragged into a conflict with Iran. But, the U.S. team did pledge the United States to Israel’s defense, and early on undertook numerous moves in support of that promise.
4. The Israel team accepted these conditions, at least initially, even while Israel was being hit by missiles from Iran, rockets from Hizballah (and a small number of rockets from Hamas), and terrorist attacks by all of the above. The Israel team did mount a pair of covert actions againstIranian targets that had already been planned and put in motion before the strike, but otherwise it simply took the hits.
5. Meanwhile, the U.S. team aggressively sought to make contact with the Iran team. Ostensibly, the purpose of these overtures was to bring about a ceasefire; however, several members of the U.S. team explicitly stated that they were hoping that the extraordinary circumstances of the crisis might allow Washington to transform its own relationship with Tehran.
Some members of both the U.S. and Israel teams averred that Israel’s strategy had been to start a war with Iran in the expectation that the United States would have no choice but to finish it. Not all members of the Israel team agreed with this perspective, some disagreed vehemently.
6. The Iran team saw opportunities to weaken Israel and demonstrate that Jerusalem would pay a heavy price for attacking Iran; to weaken the American regional position and undertake attacks on U.S. allies which would demonstrate that the United States was a paper tiger and convince those allies that supporting a confrontational policy toward Iran would be painful for them as well.
7. The Iran team ordered a wide range of actions meant simply to inflict pain on Israel without any larger strategic purpose: firing small volleys of ballistic missiles first at the Dimona Nuclear Research Center, and then at Israeli air bases; asking Hizballah and Hamas to fire rockets at Israeli population centers; firing a salvo of missiles at the Saudi oil export processing center at Abqaiq; and attempting to stir disgruntled Saudi Shi’ah in the Eastern Province to attack the Saudi regime as best they could. The Iran team also opted immediately after the Israeli strike to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and mount terrorist attacks against Europe in the hope that it would convince European governments to turn on Israel and the United States, not just in the immediate circumstances of the crisis, but over the longer term as well.
8. The Iran team concluded that the fact that many of the Israeli aircraft had traversed Saudi Arabia was proof of Israeli and Saudi collusion. Thereby, they did overstep but the measured and balanced initial American response to these attacks convinced the Iran team that they were right in this assumption and caused them to push harder, to the point where they did cross an American red line and provoked the U.S. military response they had sought to avoid.
The Iran team indicated that a less successful Israeli strike (probably a much more likely occurrence), which left part of Iran’s nuclear program intact and which Israeli follow-on strikes could have threatened, would have made them more conservative in their response. According to the Iran team, the even-handed messages they received from the U.S. team, particularly the desire for face-to-face meetings, U.S. restraint, and lack of further Israeli military actions (obviously in response to the American demands) were signs of weakness and/or an aversion to conflict with Iran.
US nuclear Bunker-Blaster B61 – with 1/3 – 6 times the explosive capacity of the Hiroshima-Bomb.
The problem with radioactive Fallout and the pollution, while rebuffed by US-NATO military analysts, would be devastating, possibly with impact on a big area of the Middle East (incl. Israel) and the Central Asian region.
Consequences in Israel
9. Iran persisted in lobbing small numbers of Shahab-3 ballistic missiles at Israeli targets, and while they did relatively little damage, the Israeli government came under pressure in the media for having undermined the Israeli deterrent. However, of far greater significance were the Hizballah rocket attacks, which gradually increased to roughly 100 short-range rockets against targets in northern Israel each day and about a half-dozen longer-range rockets aimed at Haifa and Tel Aviv. Although the rockets killed very few people, they crippled the Israeli economy.
As one member of the Israel team put it to his counterpart on the U.S. team, “A third of our population is living in shelters 24/7.” Likewise, hundreds of thousands of Israelis were temporarily leaving Tel Aviv and Haifa.
10. In response, the Israel team began to pressure the U.S. team either to have the United States do something itself or allow Israel to fight back. By the end of the simulation, eight days after the initial strike, the Israel team had secured American permission to act against Hizballah, although the U.S. team
made clear that they did not want Israel responding directly to Iran in any way.
11. Thus, as its final move, the Israel team ordered a fortyeight- hour air and special forces “blitz” against Lebanon to try to diminish, if not eliminate, the rocket fire. The Israel team was already resigned to the likely failure of this operation and had begun preparing for a more far-reaching follow-on operation involving much larger Israeli Air Force strikes and extensive ground operations into Lebanon to smash Hizballah.
It is worth noting that even this highly aggressive Iran team specifically chose not to create problems for the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan, or to otherwise directly attack American targets. Israel was still being subjected to Iranian ballistic missile strikes and was unable to do anything about them.
12. ended with the United States having given up on its efforts to engage Iran, having begun a massive military reinforcement of the Gulf region, and having committed itself (including publicly) to clearing the Strait of Hormuz and protecting Gulf oil exports, by force if necessary. Had the game gone on it would have ended with the destruction of all Iranian air-seaground assets in and around the Strait of Hormuz on top of the loss of its nuclear program.
*The United States should at least recognize the potential for Iran to lash out more aggressively in response to a strike that does great damage to its nuclear program. And that a more conservative response from Tehran might indicate that the initial strike did little damage and that Iran was fearful of provoking follow-on attacks that might succeed where the first strike had failed.
One of the most important points that the simulation illustrated was the danger for Israel that any strike against Iran could well force Jerusalem to mount major counter-terror operations against Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. If an Israeli prime minister is going to order an attack on
the Iranian nuclear program, he likely will have to be prepared to order major operations against Lebanon and Gaza too.*