Checkpoint Chertoff: A Neo- American Nightmare

Friday, November 12, 2010

Checkpoint Chertoff: A Neo- American Nightmare
Checkpoint Charlie

http://www.dailysoft.com/berlinwall/history/checkpoint-charlie.htm

A fact little known to most Americans, and certainly a surprise to this writer, Zionists gained a foothold in our federal government under President Wilson. The United States began quietly adopting the Talmud (not the written Torah/Bible) as the basis of our national law after the first Zionist judge was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Louis Brandeis was an assimilated Jew from Kentucky. He had had little formal association with Jews being more closely identified with the Brahmanism of the Bostonian social elite. Ironically, Louis Brandeis, who was to become the energetic exponent in word and deed, the legitimizer of American Zionism, descended from Judaism darkest heretical rejecters, the Jacob Frank heresies.
Jacob Frank converted, as did many of his followers, to Christianity believing in a perverted salvation theory that through the debasement of Judaism the Messiah could be forced from heaven. It was from heretical adherents of Frankist beliefs that Louis Brandeis, the spiritual and moral salvation, the galvanizer, the leader of American Zionism, and reputedly even his wife, descended from. http://www.jewishmag.com/118mag/richard_gottheil/richard_gottheil.htm

By 1939, federal agencies created under Roosevelt’s New Deal had become a “headless fourth branch of government,” and more Zionists were appointed to the Supreme Court. In 1941 Roosevelt created a committee to study the problem of federal agency rule making and suggest solutions. In 1941 the Report was made.

The need for re framing rule making under Zionist Communitarian Administrative Laws was delayed until after the end of WWII. Initially, the U.S. Congress was opposed to the Zionist “solution” because it violated the Separation of Powers clause in the U.S. Constitution. (I haven’t the resources or the time to study the “compromises” that led to passage of the act.)

“By demonstrating the philosophy of Jewish law and its moral values,
we can bring a little beacon of light in this world,”
Noson Gurary, founder of the U.S. National Institute for Judaic Law

By the time Bush II was president, the National Institute for Judaic Law was introduced openly ” to make Jewish law more accessible to everyone.” What is “Jewish Law” in Israel?

The Emergency Regulations of 1945 consist of 170 articles divided into 15 sections. They deal with censorship, the restriction of freedom of movement, every aspect of control of the freedom of speech and the press, control of the various means of transport, regulation on the possession of arms, etc. The laws give the minister of defense the power to appoint military commanders as governors over any area he may see fit. On appointment, the governor automatically becomes a competent authority with the power to enforce, at his own discretion, all powers covered by the Defense Laws. (4)

Alleged grounds for issuing an order of administrative detention under the Defense Regulations are: “To secure public safety, the maintenance of public order or suspicion of mutiny, rebellion or riot.” While the detainee is permitted theoretically to be represented by counsel, if word of his detention gets out, neither the detained nor his or her counsel is permitted to know the grounds for designating the detainee a security risk.
A soldier or policeman may hold a suspect for four days, a police officer can extend it for an additional seven days and a higher ranking officer can add another seven days. In total, a person can be brought before a military judge for the first time after eighteen days of detention.

http://www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter25.htm
My initiation into the cult of Zionist programs was involuntary. When the Seattle Community Developers used our neighborhood to test new ways to give “community” police access to private homes in order to gather our personal information, I did everything I could to “opt out.” I cited U.S. laws and codes and begged, pleaded and demanded my right to not participate in this clearly unconstitutional program… all to no avail. I had lived all my life under the assumption that American law was Supreme in the United States. The brutal truth was, to say the least, shocking. Prior to 1999 I knew next to nothing about Israel, nor did I care to know anything. It was certainly not introduced as a topic that my children’s freedom depended upon my knowing.

Checkpoint Chertoff
http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/69451.html

“We’ve borrowed this from what the … Israelis do,” Chertoff said during his 2007 address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explaining that “it involves looking at behavior, and training officers to be out in the actual flow at the airport and in the actual flow in some of our mass transit to watch the behavior of people; how they react as they approach the checkpoint, how they react as they’re unloading things. And that cues us that there may be some people we want to take a closer look at. This, by the way, is a concept that we’ve used at the border for many years, which is training people to look for human behavior which is the giveaway as to whether somebody is planning something big.” OPERATION VIPER: http://grendelreport.posterous.com/dhs-tests-airport-checkpoints
When every attempt I made to “withdraw” from the program was denied, I began investigating the “neo” community police who were created to enforce the new laws. I looked for all the ways they were gathering our private INFORMATION. I studied DOJ’s new GIS database and the EXPANDED AUTHORITY to USE it to “predict and prevent crime.” I read and re read the stated goal of every COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) GIS program tested on us. Along the way I learned about the foundation for Communitarian/Community Law, the Talmud.

“The Anti Defamation League documented a criticism that alleges that the Talmud endorses child molestation involving children under the age of three.[120] The text of the Talmud is from tractate Kethubot 11b: “If an adult has sex with a girl under the age of three, it is ignored, for it is like putting a finger in someone’s eye [i.e., tears may drip from the eye but there will always be more tears to replace them; so too the hymen of a girl so young may break but it will heal].”[121] This criticism was published by Pranaitis and repeated by modern sources.[122] However, the context of this statement is within a discussion of divorce settlements – which are higher for the wife if the wife was a virgin at the time of marriage – and that text means that if the wife was molested as a young child, she is still considered a virgin for purposes of the divorce.[123][124]” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_Talmud

Who is Michael Chertoff and what values does he hold? Apparently he’s one of the good guys fighting the Evil Axis, and like so many modern U.S. elected officials from every party and platform, he’s obviously devoted to doing god’s work.

Chertoff Joins Defense Firm that Defrauded U.S.
Saturday, March 27, 2010

Michael Chertoff, the former homeland security chief who’s not been shy about exploiting terrorist threats for the benefit of his clients, has decided to join a top defense contractor that defrauded the U.S. government.

The one-time head of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under President George W. Bush is now a board member of BAE Systems, the United Kingdom-based defense corporation that agreed to pay $447 million in fines to the American and British governments to settle allegations of corruption, including bribing a top Saudi Arabian official.

BAE is the eighth-largest contractor doing business with Washington, having received $7.1 billion in government contracts in 2009 alone. It also has received more than $200 million from DHS since 2005.

Following the attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day, Chertoff was seen on television calling for the government to buy full-body scanners for airport checkpoints. Chertoff failed to mention in numerous interviews that his consulting business represented the company, Rapiscan Systems, that makes the scanners.
-Noel Brinkerhoff
Chertoff Joins BAE, Defense Contractor Recently Embroiled In Bribery Scandal (by Dan Froomkin, Huffington Post)
Secretary Michael Chertoff Joins BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors (BAE Systems press release)
Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (by Noel Brinkerhoff, AllGov)
Chertoff Exploits Detroit Plane Bomb to Stir up Business for Client (by Noel Brinkerhoff, AllGov)
As TSA’s Administrative authority to stop, interrogate and detain American travelers extends to vehicles OUTSIDE U.S. airports, what can we expect America to “evolve” into next?

Gaza checkpoints in 2002
http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2010/01/playmobil-tsa-security-checkpoint.html

How many U.S. laws is TSA exempt from? How about we start with The Privacy Act of 1974?

++++

For those who choose further study:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(1), 40113, 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).

Source: 69 FR 35537, June 25, 2004, unless otherwise noted.

§ 1507.1 Scope.

This part implements provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act) that permit TSA to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain requirements of the Act. The procedures governing access to, and correction of, records in a TSA system of records are set forth in 6 CFR part 5, subpart B.

§ 1507.3 Exemptions.

The following TSA systems of records are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j), (k), or both, as set forth in this section. During the course of normal agency functions, exempt materials from one system of records may become part of one or more other systems of records. To the extent that any portion of system of records becomes part of another Privacy Act system of records, TSA hereby claims the same exemptions as were claimed in the original primary system of which they are a part and claims any additional exemptions in accordance with this part.

(a) Transportation Security Enforcement Record System (DHS/TSA 001). The Transportation Security Enforcement Record System (TSERS) (DHS/TSA 001) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to the screening of passengers and property and they may be used to identify, review, analyze, investigate, and prosecute violations or potential violations of criminal statutes and transportation security laws. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 001 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA, as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security, law enforcement efforts, and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension, which undermines the entire system.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA, as well as the recipient agency. Access to the records would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities, and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information, which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of transportation security laws, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective enforcement of transportation security laws, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.

(4) From subsection (e)(3) (Privacy Act Statement) because disclosing the authority, purpose, routine uses, and potential consequences of not providing information could reveal the investigative interests of TSA, as well as the nature and scope of an investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes.

(5) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(b) Transportation Workers Employment Investigations System (DHS/TSA 002). The Transportation Workers Employment Investigations System (TWEI) (DHS/TSA 002) enables TSA to facilitate the performance of background checks on employees of transportation operators and others who are issued credentials or clearances by transportation operators, other than TSA employees. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 002 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigate interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigate techniques and procedures in the transportation workers employment investigation process, as well as the nature and scope of the employment investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes and obtain access to sensitive information and restricted areas in the transportation industry. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an employment investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific employment investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive transportation worker employment investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(c) Personnel Background Investigation File System (DHS/TSA 004) . The Personnel Background Investigation File System (PBIFS) (DHS/TSA 004) enables TSA to maintain investigative and background material used to make suitability and eligibility determinations regarding current and former TSA employees, applicants for TSA employment, and TSA contract employees. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act, the Personnel Background Investigation File System is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) (Accounting of Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified because this system contains investigatory material compiled solely for determining suitability, eligibility, and qualifications for Federal civilian employment. To the extent that the disclosure of material would reveal any classified material or the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, the applicability of exemption (k)(5) will be required to honor promises of confidentiality should the data subject request access to or amendment of the record, or access to the accounting of disclosures of the record. Exemption (k)(1) will be required to protect any classified information that may be in this system.

(d) Internal Investigation Record System (DHS/TSA 005) . The Internal Investigation Record System (IIRS) (DHS/TSA 005) contains records of internal investigations for all modes of transportation for which TSA has security-related duties. This system covers information regarding investigations of allegations or appearances of misconduct of current or former TSA employees or contractors and provides support for any adverse action that may occur as a result of the findings of the investigation. It is being modified to cover investigations of security-related incidents and reviews of TSA programs and operations. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 005 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could, therefore, present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension, as well as to TSA investigative efforts.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative techniques and procedures of the investigators, as well as the nature and scope of the investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such records could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because third agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsection (e)(3) (Privacy Act Statement) because disclosing the authority, purpose, routine uses, and potential consequences of not providing information could reveal the targets of interests of the investigating office, as well as the nature and scope of an investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes.

(5) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(e) Correspondence and Matters Tracking Records (DHS/TSA 006). The Correspondence and Matters Tracking Records (CMTR) (DHS/TSA 006) system allows TSA to manage, track, retrieve, and respond to incoming correspondence, inquiries, claims and other matters presented to TSA for disposition, and to monitor the assignment, disposition and status of such matters. This system covers information coming into TSA from individuals as well as information recorded by TSA employees in the performance of their duties. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 006 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would lean of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(f) Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Records (DHS/TSA 007). The Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) Records System (DHS/TSA 007) system enables TSA to maintain records that will assist in processing access requests and administrative appeals under FOIA and access and amendments requests and appeals under the PA; participate in associated litigation; and assist TSA in carrying out any other responsibilities under FOIA/PA. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which would be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(g) General Legal Records System (DHS/TSA 009). The General Legal Records (GLR) System (DHS/TSA 009) enables TSA to maintain records that will assist attorneys to perform their functions within the office of Chief Counsel, to include providing legal advice, responding to claims filed by employees and others, and assisting in litigation and in the settlement of claims. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 009 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which would enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsections (d).

(h) Federal Flight Deck Officer Records System (DHS/TSA 013). The Federal Flight Deck Officer Record System (FFDORS) (DHS/TSA 013) enables TSA to maintain a system of records documenting the application, selection, training, and requalification of pilots deputized by TSA to perform the duties of a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO). Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(6) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 013 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), and (e)(1). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From (c)(3) (Accounting of Certain Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records), because access to the accounting of disclosures in this system could reveal the identity of a confidential source that provided information during the background check process. Without the ability to protect the identity of a confidential source, the agency’s ability to gather pertinent information about candidates for the program may be limited. In addition, the system might contain information that is properly classified, the release of which would pose a threat to national security and/or foreign policy, or information the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s). Finally, the agency must be able to protect against access to testing or examination material as release of this material could compromise the effectiveness of the testing and examination procedure itself. The examination material contained in this system is so similar in form and content to the examination material used in the selection process for TSA security screeners, or potential selection processes that TSA may utilize in the future, that release of the material would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process of those TSA employees.

(2) From (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because information obtained or made available to TSA from other agencies and other sources during the evaluation of an individual’s suitability for an FFDO position may occasionally include information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to the specific determination regarding that individual. In the interests of effective program administration, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to collect all such information that may aid in the FFDO selection process.

(i) Registered Traveler Operations Files (DHS/TSA 015) . The purpose of this system is to pre-screen and positively identify volunteer travelers using advanced identification technologies and conduct a security threat assessment to ensure that the volunteer does not pose a security threat. This system may expedite the pre-boarding process for the traveler and improve the allocation of TSA’s security resources on individuals who may pose a security threat. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 015 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of heightened security concerns relating to an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of an investigative interest on the part of the Department of Homeland Security or another Federal law enforcement or other recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the program suitability determination, which undermines the entire system.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to some of the records contained in this system of records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the program suitability determination. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing security assessment investigations and program suitability determinations and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring such investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s) and 49 CFR part 1520, the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of screening applicants for program suitability, TSA must be able to review information from a variety of sources. What information is relevant and necessary may not always be apparent until after the evaluation is completed. In the interests of transportation security, it is appropriate to include a broad range of information that may aid in determining an applicant’s suitability for the Registered Traveler program.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(j) Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) Operations Files. Transportation Security Intelligence Service Operations Files (TSIS) (DHS/TSA 011) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to intelligence gathering activities used to identify, review, analyze, investigate, and prevent violations or potential violations of transportation security laws. This system also contains records relating to determinations about individuals’ qualifications, eligibility, or suitability for access to classified information. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 011 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of intelligence gather operations and reveal investigative interest on the part of the Transportation Security Administration, as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede operations and avoid detection and apprehension, which undermined the entire system. Disclosure of the accounting may also reveal the existence of information that is classified or sensitive security information, the release of which would be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of intelligence gathering operations and reveal investigative interest on the part of the Transportation Security Administration. Access to the records would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede operations and possibly avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing intelligence and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information, which could be detrimental to transportation security if released. This system may also include information necessary to make a determination as to an individual’s qualifications, eligibility, or suitability for access to classified information, the release of which would reveal the identity of a source who received an express or implied assurance that their identity would not be revealed to the subject of the record.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of gathering and analyzing information about potential threats to transportation security, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific operation. In the interests of transportation security, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in identifying threats to transportation security and establishing other patterns of unlawful activity.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(k) Secure Flight Records . (1) Secure Flight Records (DHS/TSA 019) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to watch list matching applied to air passengers and to non-traveling individuals authorized to enter an airport sterile area. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), TSA is claiming the following exemptions for certain records within the Secure Flight Records system: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g).

(2) In addition to records under the control of TSA, the Secure Flight system of records may include records originating from systems of records of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies which may be exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. However, TSA does not assert exemption to any provisions of the Privacy Act with respect to information submitted by or on behalf of individual passengers or non-travelers in the course of making a reservation or seeking access to a secured area under the Secure Flight program.

(3) To the extent the Secure Flight system contains records originating from other systems of records, TSA will rely on the exemptions claimed for those records in the originating system of records. Exemptions for certain records within the Secure Flight Records system from particular subsections of the Privacy Act are justified for the following reasons:

(i) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because giving a record subject access to the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him or her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency because the individual who is the subject of the record would learn of third agency investigative interests and could take steps to evade detection or apprehension. Disclosure of the accounting also could reveal the details of watch list matching measures under the Secure Flight program, as well as capabilities and vulnerabilities of the watch list matching process, the release of which could permit an individual to evade future detection and thereby impede efforts to ensure transportation security.

(ii) From subsection (c)(4) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(iii) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law enforcement counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another’s personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(iv) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for TSA or other agencies to know in advance what information is both relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between aviation passengers or certain non-travelers and a known or suspected terrorist. In addition, because TSA and other agencies may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.

(v) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations, it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(vi) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require TSA to provide notice to an individual if TSA or another agency receives or collects information about that individual during an investigation or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(vii) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).

(viii) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system coming from other system of records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for TSA to ensure their compliance with this provision, however, TSA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in the watch list matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies’ trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. However, TSA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that the data used in the watch list matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible.

(ix) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on TSA and other agencies and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.

(x) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(xi) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[69 FR 35537, June 25, 2004, as amended at 70 FR 33384, June 8, 2005; 71 FR 44227, Aug. 4, 2006; 72 FR 63709, Nov. 9, 2007]

http://nikiraapana.blogspot.com/2010/11/checkpoint-chertoff-neo-american.html

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Friday, November 12, 2010
Checkpoint Chertoff: A Neo- American Nightmare
Checkpoint Charlie

http://www.dailysoft.com/berlinwall/history/checkpoint-charlie.htm

A fact little known to most Americans, and certainly a surprise to this writer, Zionists gained a foothold in our federal government under President Wilson. The United States began quietly adopting the Talmud (not the written Torah/Bible) as the basis of our national law after the first Zionist judge was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Louis Brandeis was an assimilated Jew from Kentucky. He had had little formal association with Jews being more closely identified with the Brahmanism of the Bostonian social elite. Ironically, Louis Brandeis, who was to become the energetic exponent in word and deed, the legitimizer of American Zionism, descended from Judaism darkest heretical rejecters, the Jacob Frank heresies.
Jacob Frank converted, as did many of his followers, to Christianity believing in a perverted salvation theory that through the debasement of Judaism the Messiah could be forced from heaven. It was from heretical adherents of Frankist beliefs that Louis Brandeis, the spiritual and moral salvation, the galvanizer, the leader of American Zionism, and reputedly even his wife, descended from. http://www.jewishmag.com/118mag/richard_gottheil/richard_gottheil.htm

By 1939, federal agencies created under Roosevelt’s New Deal had become a “headless fourth branch of government,” and more Zionists were appointed to the Supreme Court. In 1941 Roosevelt created a committee to study the problem of federal agency rule making and suggest solutions. In 1941 the Report was made.

The need for re framing rule making under Zionist Communitarian Administrative Laws was delayed until after the end of WWII. Initially, the U.S. Congress was opposed to the Zionist “solution” because it violated the Separation of Powers clause in the U.S. Constitution. (I haven’t the resources or the time to study the “compromises” that led to passage of the act.)

“By demonstrating the philosophy of Jewish law and its moral values,
we can bring a little beacon of light in this world,”
Noson Gurary, founder of the U.S. National Institute for Judaic Law

By the time Bush II was president, the National Institute for Judaic Law was introduced openly ” to make Jewish law more accessible to everyone.” What is “Jewish Law” in Israel?

The Emergency Regulations of 1945 consist of 170 articles divided into 15 sections. They deal with censorship, the restriction of freedom of movement, every aspect of control of the freedom of speech and the press, control of the various means of transport, regulation on the possession of arms, etc. The laws give the minister of defense the power to appoint military commanders as governors over any area he may see fit. On appointment, the governor automatically becomes a competent authority with the power to enforce, at his own discretion, all powers covered by the Defense Laws. (4)

Alleged grounds for issuing an order of administrative detention under the Defense Regulations are: “To secure public safety, the maintenance of public order or suspicion of mutiny, rebellion or riot.” While the detainee is permitted theoretically to be represented by counsel, if word of his detention gets out, neither the detained nor his or her counsel is permitted to know the grounds for designating the detainee a security risk.
A soldier or policeman may hold a suspect for four days, a police officer can extend it for an additional seven days and a higher ranking officer can add another seven days. In total, a person can be brought before a military judge for the first time after eighteen days of detention.

http://www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter25.htm
My initiation into the cult of Zionist programs was involuntary. When the Seattle Community Developers used our neighborhood to test new ways to give “community” police access to private homes in order to gather our personal information, I did everything I could to “opt out.” I cited U.S. laws and codes and begged, pleaded and demanded my right to not participate in this clearly unconstitutional program… all to no avail. I had lived all my life under the assumption that American law was Supreme in the United States. The brutal truth was, to say the least, shocking. Prior to 1999 I knew next to nothing about Israel, nor did I care to know anything. It was certainly not introduced as a topic that my children’s freedom depended upon my knowing.

Checkpoint Chertoff
http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/69451.html

“We’ve borrowed this from what the … Israelis do,” Chertoff said during his 2007 address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explaining that “it involves looking at behavior, and training officers to be out in the actual flow at the airport and in the actual flow in some of our mass transit to watch the behavior of people; how they react as they approach the checkpoint, how they react as they’re unloading things. And that cues us that there may be some people we want to take a closer look at. This, by the way, is a concept that we’ve used at the border for many years, which is training people to look for human behavior which is the giveaway as to whether somebody is planning something big.” OPERATION VIPER: http://grendelreport.posterous.com/dhs-tests-airport-checkpoints
When every attempt I made to “withdraw” from the program was denied, I began investigating the “neo” community police who were created to enforce the new laws. I looked for all the ways they were gathering our private INFORMATION. I studied DOJ’s new GIS database and the EXPANDED AUTHORITY to USE it to “predict and prevent crime.” I read and re read the stated goal of every COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) GIS program tested on us. Along the way I learned about the foundation for Communitarian/Community Law, the Talmud.

“The Anti Defamation League documented a criticism that alleges that the Talmud endorses child molestation involving children under the age of three.[120] The text of the Talmud is from tractate Kethubot 11b: “If an adult has sex with a girl under the age of three, it is ignored, for it is like putting a finger in someone’s eye [i.e., tears may drip from the eye but there will always be more tears to replace them; so too the hymen of a girl so young may break but it will heal].”[121] This criticism was published by Pranaitis and repeated by modern sources.[122] However, the context of this statement is within a discussion of divorce settlements – which are higher for the wife if the wife was a virgin at the time of marriage – and that text means that if the wife was molested as a young child, she is still considered a virgin for purposes of the divorce.[123][124]” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_Talmud

Who is Michael Chertoff and what values does he hold? Apparently he’s one of the good guys fighting the Evil Axis, and like so many modern U.S. elected officials from every party and platform, he’s obviously devoted to doing god’s work.

Chertoff Joins Defense Firm that Defrauded U.S.
Saturday, March 27, 2010

Michael Chertoff, the former homeland security chief who’s not been shy about exploiting terrorist threats for the benefit of his clients, has decided to join a top defense contractor that defrauded the U.S. government.

The one-time head of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under President George W. Bush is now a board member of BAE Systems, the United Kingdom-based defense corporation that agreed to pay $447 million in fines to the American and British governments to settle allegations of corruption, including bribing a top Saudi Arabian official.

BAE is the eighth-largest contractor doing business with Washington, having received $7.1 billion in government contracts in 2009 alone. It also has received more than $200 million from DHS since 2005.

Following the attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day, Chertoff was seen on television calling for the government to buy full-body scanners for airport checkpoints. Chertoff failed to mention in numerous interviews that his consulting business represented the company, Rapiscan Systems, that makes the scanners.
-Noel Brinkerhoff
Chertoff Joins BAE, Defense Contractor Recently Embroiled In Bribery Scandal (by Dan Froomkin, Huffington Post)
Secretary Michael Chertoff Joins BAE Systems, Inc. Board of Directors (BAE Systems press release)
Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (by Noel Brinkerhoff, AllGov)
Chertoff Exploits Detroit Plane Bomb to Stir up Business for Client (by Noel Brinkerhoff, AllGov)
As TSA’s Administrative authority to stop, interrogate and detain American travelers extends to vehicles OUTSIDE U.S. airports, what can we expect America to “evolve” into next?

Gaza checkpoints in 2002
http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2010/01/playmobil-tsa-security-checkpoint.html

How many U.S. laws is TSA exempt from? How about we start with The Privacy Act of 1974?

++++

For those who choose further study:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(1), 40113, 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).

Source: 69 FR 35537, June 25, 2004, unless otherwise noted.

§ 1507.1 Scope.

This part implements provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act) that permit TSA to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain requirements of the Act. The procedures governing access to, and correction of, records in a TSA system of records are set forth in 6 CFR part 5, subpart B.

§ 1507.3 Exemptions.

The following TSA systems of records are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j), (k), or both, as set forth in this section. During the course of normal agency functions, exempt materials from one system of records may become part of one or more other systems of records. To the extent that any portion of system of records becomes part of another Privacy Act system of records, TSA hereby claims the same exemptions as were claimed in the original primary system of which they are a part and claims any additional exemptions in accordance with this part.

(a) Transportation Security Enforcement Record System (DHS/TSA 001). The Transportation Security Enforcement Record System (TSERS) (DHS/TSA 001) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to the screening of passengers and property and they may be used to identify, review, analyze, investigate, and prosecute violations or potential violations of criminal statutes and transportation security laws. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 001 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA, as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security, law enforcement efforts, and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension, which undermines the entire system.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA, as well as the recipient agency. Access to the records would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities, and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information, which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of transportation security laws, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective enforcement of transportation security laws, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.

(4) From subsection (e)(3) (Privacy Act Statement) because disclosing the authority, purpose, routine uses, and potential consequences of not providing information could reveal the investigative interests of TSA, as well as the nature and scope of an investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes.

(5) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(b) Transportation Workers Employment Investigations System (DHS/TSA 002). The Transportation Workers Employment Investigations System (TWEI) (DHS/TSA 002) enables TSA to facilitate the performance of background checks on employees of transportation operators and others who are issued credentials or clearances by transportation operators, other than TSA employees. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 002 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigate interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigate techniques and procedures in the transportation workers employment investigation process, as well as the nature and scope of the employment investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes and obtain access to sensitive information and restricted areas in the transportation industry. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an employment investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific employment investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive transportation worker employment investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(c) Personnel Background Investigation File System (DHS/TSA 004) . The Personnel Background Investigation File System (PBIFS) (DHS/TSA 004) enables TSA to maintain investigative and background material used to make suitability and eligibility determinations regarding current and former TSA employees, applicants for TSA employment, and TSA contract employees. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act, the Personnel Background Investigation File System is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) (Accounting of Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified because this system contains investigatory material compiled solely for determining suitability, eligibility, and qualifications for Federal civilian employment. To the extent that the disclosure of material would reveal any classified material or the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, the applicability of exemption (k)(5) will be required to honor promises of confidentiality should the data subject request access to or amendment of the record, or access to the accounting of disclosures of the record. Exemption (k)(1) will be required to protect any classified information that may be in this system.

(d) Internal Investigation Record System (DHS/TSA 005) . The Internal Investigation Record System (IIRS) (DHS/TSA 005) contains records of internal investigations for all modes of transportation for which TSA has security-related duties. This system covers information regarding investigations of allegations or appearances of misconduct of current or former TSA employees or contractors and provides support for any adverse action that may occur as a result of the findings of the investigation. It is being modified to cover investigations of security-related incidents and reviews of TSA programs and operations. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 005 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could, therefore, present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension, as well as to TSA investigative efforts.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative techniques and procedures of the investigators, as well as the nature and scope of the investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such records could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because third agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsection (e)(3) (Privacy Act Statement) because disclosing the authority, purpose, routine uses, and potential consequences of not providing information could reveal the targets of interests of the investigating office, as well as the nature and scope of an investigation, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes.

(5) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(e) Correspondence and Matters Tracking Records (DHS/TSA 006). The Correspondence and Matters Tracking Records (CMTR) (DHS/TSA 006) system allows TSA to manage, track, retrieve, and respond to incoming correspondence, inquiries, claims and other matters presented to TSA for disposition, and to monitor the assignment, disposition and status of such matters. This system covers information coming into TSA from individuals as well as information recorded by TSA employees in the performance of their duties. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 006 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would lean of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(f) Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Records (DHS/TSA 007). The Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) Records System (DHS/TSA 007) system enables TSA to maintain records that will assist in processing access requests and administrative appeals under FOIA and access and amendments requests and appeals under the PA; participate in associated litigation; and assist TSA in carrying out any other responsibilities under FOIA/PA. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which could enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which would be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(g) General Legal Records System (DHS/TSA 009). The General Legal Records (GLR) System (DHS/TSA 009) enables TSA to maintain records that will assist attorneys to perform their functions within the office of Chief Counsel, to include providing legal advice, responding to claims filed by employees and others, and assisting in litigation and in the settlement of claims. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 009 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures), because release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency, as the individual who is the subject of a record would learn of third-agency investigative interests and thereby avoid detection or apprehension.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records), because access to the records contained in this system could reveal investigative interest on the part of TSA or other agency and the nature of that interest, the disclosure of which would enable individuals to circumvent agency regulations or statutes. The information contained in the system might include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could reveal sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s), the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because third-agency records obtained or made available to TSA during the course of an investigation may occasionally contain information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of administering an effective and comprehensive investigation program, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to retain all such information that may aid in that process.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsections (d).

(h) Federal Flight Deck Officer Records System (DHS/TSA 013). The Federal Flight Deck Officer Record System (FFDORS) (DHS/TSA 013) enables TSA to maintain a system of records documenting the application, selection, training, and requalification of pilots deputized by TSA to perform the duties of a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO). Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(6) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 013 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), and (e)(1). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From (c)(3) (Accounting of Certain Disclosures) and (d) (Access to Records), because access to the accounting of disclosures in this system could reveal the identity of a confidential source that provided information during the background check process. Without the ability to protect the identity of a confidential source, the agency’s ability to gather pertinent information about candidates for the program may be limited. In addition, the system might contain information that is properly classified, the release of which would pose a threat to national security and/or foreign policy, or information the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the security of transportation pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s). Finally, the agency must be able to protect against access to testing or examination material as release of this material could compromise the effectiveness of the testing and examination procedure itself. The examination material contained in this system is so similar in form and content to the examination material used in the selection process for TSA security screeners, or potential selection processes that TSA may utilize in the future, that release of the material would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process of those TSA employees.

(2) From (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information), because information obtained or made available to TSA from other agencies and other sources during the evaluation of an individual’s suitability for an FFDO position may occasionally include information that is not strictly relevant or necessary to the specific determination regarding that individual. In the interests of effective program administration, it is appropriate and necessary for TSA to collect all such information that may aid in the FFDO selection process.

(i) Registered Traveler Operations Files (DHS/TSA 015) . The purpose of this system is to pre-screen and positively identify volunteer travelers using advanced identification technologies and conduct a security threat assessment to ensure that the volunteer does not pose a security threat. This system may expedite the pre-boarding process for the traveler and improve the allocation of TSA’s security resources on individuals who may pose a security threat. Pursuant to exemptions (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 015 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of heightened security concerns relating to an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of an investigative interest on the part of the Department of Homeland Security or another Federal law enforcement or other recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the program suitability determination, which undermines the entire system.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to some of the records contained in this system of records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the program suitability determination. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing security assessment investigations and program suitability determinations and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring such investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information protected pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 114(s) and 49 CFR part 1520, the disclosure of which could be detrimental to transportation security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of screening applicants for program suitability, TSA must be able to review information from a variety of sources. What information is relevant and necessary may not always be apparent until after the evaluation is completed. In the interests of transportation security, it is appropriate to include a broad range of information that may aid in determining an applicant’s suitability for the Registered Traveler program.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(j) Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) Operations Files. Transportation Security Intelligence Service Operations Files (TSIS) (DHS/TSA 011) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to intelligence gathering activities used to identify, review, analyze, investigate, and prevent violations or potential violations of transportation security laws. This system also contains records relating to determinations about individuals’ qualifications, eligibility, or suitability for access to classified information. Pursuant to exemptions (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act, DHS/TSA 011 is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f). Exemptions from particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of intelligence gather operations and reveal investigative interest on the part of the Transportation Security Administration, as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to transportation security law enforcement efforts and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede operations and avoid detection and apprehension, which undermined the entire system. Disclosure of the accounting may also reveal the existence of information that is classified or sensitive security information, the release of which would be detrimental to the security of transportation.

(2) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of intelligence gathering operations and reveal investigative interest on the part of the Transportation Security Administration. Access to the records would permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede operations and possibly avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing intelligence and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually reinvestigated. The information contained in the system may also include properly classified information, the release of which would pose a threat to national defense and/or foreign policy. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information also could disclose sensitive security information, which could be detrimental to transportation security if released. This system may also include information necessary to make a determination as to an individual’s qualifications, eligibility, or suitability for access to classified information, the release of which would reveal the identity of a source who received an express or implied assurance that their identity would not be revealed to the subject of the record.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of gathering and analyzing information about potential threats to transportation security, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific operation. In the interests of transportation security, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in identifying threats to transportation security and establishing other patterns of unlawful activity.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) (Agency Requirements), and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(k) Secure Flight Records . (1) Secure Flight Records (DHS/TSA 019) enables TSA to maintain a system of records related to watch list matching applied to air passengers and to non-traveling individuals authorized to enter an airport sterile area. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), TSA is claiming the following exemptions for certain records within the Secure Flight Records system: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g).

(2) In addition to records under the control of TSA, the Secure Flight system of records may include records originating from systems of records of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies which may be exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. However, TSA does not assert exemption to any provisions of the Privacy Act with respect to information submitted by or on behalf of individual passengers or non-travelers in the course of making a reservation or seeking access to a secured area under the Secure Flight program.

(3) To the extent the Secure Flight system contains records originating from other systems of records, TSA will rely on the exemptions claimed for those records in the originating system of records. Exemptions for certain records within the Secure Flight Records system from particular subsections of the Privacy Act are justified for the following reasons:

(i) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because giving a record subject access to the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him or her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency because the individual who is the subject of the record would learn of third agency investigative interests and could take steps to evade detection or apprehension. Disclosure of the accounting also could reveal the details of watch list matching measures under the Secure Flight program, as well as capabilities and vulnerabilities of the watch list matching process, the release of which could permit an individual to evade future detection and thereby impede efforts to ensure transportation security.

(ii) From subsection (c)(4) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(iii) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law enforcement counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another’s personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(iv) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for TSA or other agencies to know in advance what information is both relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between aviation passengers or certain non-travelers and a known or suspected terrorist. In addition, because TSA and other agencies may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.

(v) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations, it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(vi) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require TSA to provide notice to an individual if TSA or another agency receives or collects information about that individual during an investigation or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(vii) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).

(viii) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system coming from other system of records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for TSA to ensure their compliance with this provision, however, TSA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in the watch list matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies’ trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. However, TSA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that the data used in the watch list matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible.

(ix) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on TSA and other agencies and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.

(x) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(xi) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[69 FR 35537, June 25, 2004, as amended at 70 FR 33384, June 8, 2005; 71 FR 44227, Aug. 4, 2006; 72 FR 63709, Nov. 9, 2007]

Posted by Niki Raapana at 9:58 AM
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Labels: Executive Order 12425, legal, legislative, Privacy Act 1974, Regulatory, TSA, US Code 552a
16 comments:
whatbox? said…
Phew! Wow! Etc. Really.
So, Nikki-ji, after reading all this, sheeple will still walk, head down, to be ogled by a TSA goon or worse yet, allow themselves and their children to be felt-up.

Living the Zionist nightmare, it just begs the question, why? They are all over India too by the way. And now we are Amerika’s bestest friends. Yipee. That means we will be first in line for for scanners, probes and chips.
Aren’t we lucky?

Generally, just beyond belief and again begs the question, why? And in whose name and in what fear do we allow it?

Anadianant
http://aadivaahan.wordpress.com

November 13, 2010 2:55 AM
Anonymous said…
Don’t forget the zionists crimes. 9/11 and Israel, here:
http://www.iuniverse.com/Bookstore/BookDetail.aspx?BookId=SKU-000190526

November 13, 2010 4:07 AM
Anonymous said…
This is almost overwhelming and yet… should be sent to everyone…That way we can at least “say you were warned”…As if we needed one more reason to NOT fly…
So this is how it feels prior to total fascism take over?? Once again,(as a ‘Nam vet) I look at leaving this insanity to almost any third world country (south of Mexico). I have endeavored to not buy anything made in Israel for years..They are the new Nazi/Communists …they are doing a great job of imitating Stalin.
And no I won’t fly which means there are resorts that won’t see my dollars…

November 13, 2010 7:45 AM
Anonymous said…
Just for clarification, there were never any so-called “Jews” in the Old Testament. 90% of so-called “jews” are proselytes to Talmudic Judaism and can be free from the BONDAGE of talmudic Judaism by simply KNOWING the Truth. The Truth is the so-called “Jews” are not even one TRIBE of the Children of Israel. IPSO FACTO the “JEWS” cannot be Israel because the Children of israel have never been “Jewish”. Jewish means simply believing the Lies of the Talmud. As long as the Children of Israel {White people} insist on being Stupid/spiritually BLIND they will endure the indignities ENFORCED by the Hate Jesus people who manufacture lies from whole cloth and offer bulk discounts and easy credit terms…can you say constructive fraud…?

November 13, 2010 8:55 AM
Anonymous said…
Time for the $.50 cent solution to the source of our multitude of ‘opportunities’

November 13, 2010 11:53 AM
Niki Raapana said…
Anadiant, “Why” is the only question that matters, I agree. I don’t have the answer to that, all I do know is the people I always expected to become most indignant over this were the ones who told me I should stop my research. It’s a terrible price we are paying for our neglect and complicity, and this is definitely a GLOBAL problem that cannot be defeated by one nation alone. And I like your warrior series, good stuff.🙂

The criminal cabal includes a lot more than just the Zionists and their claims to religion appears to be just a front and a way to mask their true intentions. I have found Zionists to come in many disguises… even Muslim. The Christian Americans who support it are some of the most dangerous because they aren’t capable of seeing how they’ve been used. This is why an understanding of their belief system, COMMUNITARIANISM, is so important, and so ignored.

I wish I knew of a solution that I could endorse as plausible, and one that only costs 50 cents would be awesome! I don’t think boycotting the airlines will do the trick since it is the whole unconstitutional system of DHS that needs to be completely dismantled. It is sad to hear so many Americans saying they’ve “taken” our rights.. because our rights come from our Creator which means no man can ever “take” them anywhere. When we allow ourselves to be manipulated into believing our rights are up for grabs by whoever uses the most force against us, we’ve already lost our claim to autonomy. I don’t suggest violence, but I am certain of my own automatic reaction to invasions of my privacy. I may be just a decaying little old woman but my spirit is still strong enough to stand up for what I know is my natural heritage.

November 13, 2010 6:05 PM
Anonymous said…
Niki, not everyone has had their rights taken. I haven’t given mine to anyone, nor do I intend to.

I believe the .50 solution being referred to means, “the price of a bullet”.

You, may be against violent solutions. Many others, such as myself, though not desiring it, will use it, when they do come for our rights.

This isn’t pre-WW2 Germany. This is the U.S.A., in spite of the crap they think they are getting away with.

When the “brownshirts” come, they will fall at the doors they try to kick open.

TSA, FBI, CIA, NSA, DHS, whatever, they aren’t any more bulletproof than the average citizen.

November 13, 2010 10:14 PM
Niki Raapana said…
You’re right, this isn’t pre-WWII Germany, and I don’t see brownshirts coming and kicking in our doors. I see foreign community organizers coming to see if they can “help” us build a safer and more livable community. I see more and more regulators that tell us what color to paint our doors. I see health and safety inspections before we rent, buy or sell our homes. I see compulsory volunteer service when the community is hard hit by economic or natural disasters. I see roadblocks for DUIs and new regulations that say we can’t cut our trees or fish in our rivers or drill for oil. I see 43 million Americans living on food stamps and paying 6 dollars in federal taxes on one pack of cigarettes. I see more taxes on “unhealthy” foods and more smug Americans turning others in for yelling at a spouse or kids. I see all kinds of little things that alone maybe aren’t much but together they add up to a loss of freedom that’s beyond creepy.

And when I said my automatic reaction to invasions of my space, I meant my automatic 9mm. I don’t “suggest” violence because that makes me a terrorist threat.🙂

My neighbors assured me they’re “ready” when the brownshirts come, but I got a bad feeling the reason they won’t let us cut all the dead trees for firewood is they plan on using the deadfall to burn us out when the park expands and we’re all relocated to Anchorage. Sure hope I’m wrong about that.

November 14, 2010 1:04 AM
Stanley said…
The people who make up these communitarian rules amongst us, these people who man the security checkpoints, the TSA, and other alphabet agencies, who are they? I always thought that when push came to shove that the people who were to enforce the laws taking away our freedoms would be decent enough to question the authority that gave the orders. I always wondered how the Germans went along with the socialists, if they were decent people. We now are getting a firsthand look at how a people are subjugated, once again using economic need to trump common sense and human decency. But this time who will ride to the rescue from facism?

November 14, 2010 11:18 AM
Anonymous said…
Why doesn’t everyone just stand up to these terrorists and STOP FLYING. I refuse to fly anymore (at least until after the revolution and we have taken our country back from the zionists).

November 14, 2010 1:32 PM
Anonymous said…
Re: Checkpoint Chertoff

Thought you might want this link.
http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/showdown-tsa-threatens-10000-fine-and-civil-court-if-man-who-refused-scan-and-groping-left-security-area_11152010

I didn’t and won’t comment on the above. It seems the IVth Amendment no longer exists and therefore the Ist Amendment rights are subject to interpretation by the PTB.

I haven’t the time or inclination to spend days/weeks/months researching what the Patriot Act has now deemed traitorous acts. Mayhaps being a Constitutionalist is now an act against national security. I have no reason to think otherwise. The evidence so far seems to be that we are just running 26 years late.

Atlas is getting antsy and just might shrug. And that is what scares me even more.

November 15, 2010 1:52 PM
Anonymous said…
Dobra pazhalavat v gulag….

Russian for, “Welcome to the gulag”…

I often ask the question, “How far do THEY have to push us, before we say NO?”

Can they push us TOO FAR?

The whole TSA thing is pretty far, IMHO…, yet the sheeple obey so they can fly off to far away lands.

I’ve given up. I’m working to leave this gulag and go to the 3rd world.

It’s ironic, that the more developed a country is, the more restrictions are put on the people. The undeveloped countries seem to have a lot more freedoms (sure, there are exceptions).

My wife is from Dominican Republic. I know people there that run a business out of their front room, selling food, beer, cigars, cigarettes, sugar, etc. to the neighborhood. No permits, license, govt permissions, etc. required.

Another neighbor has a small building, much like a fireworks stand seen in Amerika, where he opens in the afternoon to sell beer. Permit?, no. License?, no. Permissions?, no.

Taxes in DR? Only if you make more than $35k/yr, which most Dominicans do not. Property taxes?, nope.

Freedom of speech? You can pretty much say and do what you want, as long as it is not harmful to other people.

Price? Living in the 3rd world… But my viewpoint on this is I won’t be contributing my taxes to keep feeding the beast Amerika has become. My $$$ will not be going to continue and expand the Empire and it’s war crimes…

Adios y da svidanya Amerika.

@>–‘—,–
The White Rose

November 19, 2010 9:33 AM
Niki Raapana said…
Chertoff Group PR release:

“The Chertoff Group played no role in the sale of whole body imaging technology to TSA,” said spokeswoman Katy Montgomery.

“Further, Secretary Michael Chertoff was in no way compensated for his public statements, in which he has consistently expressed long held beliefs in the deployment of effective technologies and techniques that eliminate security vulnerabilities such as those illustrated last year during the terrorist attempt on Christmas Day. Any statements to the contrary are false.”
http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/70254.html

Ah… the White Rose.. was there ever a nobler attempt to resist tyranny? What an inspiration they were to us in the beginning… what a bad precedent they will be in the end. To be the last people guillotined is an honor I can live without. The American and British expat communities in third world countries do seem to be thriving. Too bad for me I’m one of those dummies who thought it was worth it to stand my ground and defend my home against the invaders. But I agree I’d be much better off if I’d have moved to Panama and did anything besides research and write for the ACL. I looked into investments in Teak farms, but the reality is I don’t have anything to invest!🙂 I’m probably going down with the ship. Ahoy!

November 19, 2010 2:45 PM
Anonymous said…
Just to introduce myself and perhaps form a sort of global community of SOvereign Individuals who wishes the same for his fellow man and humanity in general :-

Third Force (Malaysian Green Party)
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?sk=group_161380297228234&ap=1

1) Freedom from Apartheid/Fascism
2) Freedom from Religious-Persecution/Religious-Supremacy.
3) Equality for all ethnicities and faiths in all aspects of policy, Law and Constitution.

The above group is just in case Haris/RPK themselves are also trojans (I’d say a clique of closet elitists distancing themselves from the iteneratnt bloggers via moderation to oblibvion of comments – but only THIS CRIME against humanity so far). We as citizens can’t trust any political parties (even NGOs) and have to run as independents if needed.

Until they prove to be trojans though, I consider MCLM’s 3rd Force viable and a foil to hide behind till they foul up big if ever . . . The real 3rd Force is always the NEUTRAL citizen, no one else with any agenda whatsoever. Who knows they might grant everything suggested !

Apart from the above 3 items we neutral citizens need to :

Disallow ANY Oligarchy/Nepotism
End/Buy-Up Toll Concessions
End Forced Military Conscriptions
End Vehicular-APs
Block VAT / Block GST
Lower Election Deposits from 15,000 to 15.00 (so everyone can join and not be prevented by this plutocratic deterrence the poorest man has a right to join and 15,000 is prohibitive, must be lowered to allow the poorest)

Then study the below as well for good measure :

EDUCATE YOURSELF ON TYPES OF DEMOCRACY

USA, UK and Malaysia, are representative democracies (2nd class version) and thus not truly open systems being limited to the whims and fancies of parliamentarians alone.

*Participatory Democracy* (1st class version) is a process emphasizing the broad participation of constituents in the direction and operation of political systems not in isolation of populist political groups but inclusive of academic and bureaucratic groups.

*Participatory Democracy* avoids the concept of the people having a single view with the inevitable limitations that come from trying to agree what that view is.

Government is heavily decentralized into smaller independent groups to allow personalized preferences within groups to be expressed in a functional manner PREFERRED by each particular group.

The system seeks to avoid problems with centralized and electoral governance, while still providing a stable democratic system and ensuring all forms of human expression especially those diametrically opposed to be allowed expression. For example theocrat moralists / and sin industries (adult or gambling) can all be represented and functional even while proponents within each group do not use or believe in the other.

All expressions of humanity thus will have their own place, albeit in a highly separated manner. Try the below related links for articles/discussions on Participative Democracy :

(1)
Shadow cabinet Thursday, October 14, 2010 (Ktemoc) Authoritarianism vs. Seperation of Powers and Complacency of Citizens
http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=318515515322&topic=15643

(2)
Unsuitable to Vote : Individuals Causing Notable Conflict of Interest in Local Council Elections – Original Article 6th
http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=318515515322&topic=15468

(3)
The column that wasn’t – Marina Mahathir – 3rd March 2010
http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=318515515322&topic=13433

Also these charts to prevent conflict of interest / vested interest :

(4)
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=318515515322&v=photos

All the above should be 3rd Force Agenda. Any further thoughts and ideas? Remember that we are all leaders, that all citizens are equal in a modern democracy. The 3rd Force method will be to present a governance paradigm so transparent and attractive and protective of the Rakyat that everyone would vote for 3rd Force.

cont…

November 21, 2010 3:30 PM
Anonymous said…
. . . cont from above . . .

MCLM of course can take up the above, which means I will not need to form anything to implement the above, but someone has to address the inclination towards ‘Elegant Silence’ or at least ‘Harmful Delays’. If they turn trojan on us, then we NEUTRAL 3rd Forcers must be very prepared to run on our own with whatever little resources or knowledge compounded by sheer lack of ethos (or lack of infamy/infamy) we have.

Finally this series of events below, where DAP looks like it’s standards are slipping and all the below abuses are ISA-like in nature though not readily apparent until applied :

DAP’s democracy in Penang (Tuesday, November 16, 2010)
http://apanama2020.blogspot.com/2010/11/daps-democracy-in-penang.html
http://aliran.com/3307.html (read commentaries and be aware that Aliran fettes DAP rather than be neutral)

Compensation for Rep’s Kin – by Sunday Star – 18th APR 2010
http://hi-in.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=318515515322&topic=13447

The Gambier Threat – Mid 2010

Invasive By-Laws Against Sovereignty of Title/Land Owners
http://jeremiahfoo.com/?p=5887&cpage=1#comment-100231
http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=318515515322&topic=14724

Be prepared readers, for like Aliran which failed to highlight or even suggest a re-election, MCLM could turn out to be an exercise in self promotion that leads nowhere! Joining Pakatan Rayat to cure it or setting up an Independent’s group could be the other option if nothing materialises but then again, true colours would be revealed by GE13 . . .

Meanwhile Zaid’s 3rd Force (not necessarily the same as MCLM???) looks good as any existing party. At least Zaid exhorts ideals. All the commentators here, how about getting off the armchairs and getting in touch with Zaid? He certainly needs help and we could also set the tone for a better political party.

THESE IDEAS ARE FOR THE USA

Put out a bill to LOWER the election deposit for candidates who wish to run for any level of government to $USD1.00 from whatever it currently is. Then see which senators support or not support this bill which will make running for election an equally respected right as that to VOTE.

You will also immediately identify the PLUTOCRATS among the entire Senate and in Parliament. This is a kind of acid test to weed out the parasites from those truly serving America.

Then the other bill to test them would be to require all Senators, Governors, Mayors etc. who have declared assets of more than USD$20 million and above to STOP taking salaries. See who ratifies and who does not. All the true colours will be revealed.

(note the 19 senators voting to end internet freedom here as well :

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/20/the-19-senators-who-voted_n_786369.html

November 21, 2010 3:31 PM
gayuh said…
Checkpoint Chertoff: A Neo- American Nightmare
nice posts, thanks for the information .. please visit my back

November 27, 2010 8:42 PM

for anyone not knowing Michael Chertoff- here he is!!

One response to “Checkpoint Chertoff: A Neo- American Nightmare

  1. CLEVER EH- DISTRACTING YOUR ATTENTION TOWARDS MUSLIMS?

    http://nikiraapana.blogspot.com/2010/11/checkpoint-chertoff-neo-american.html

    WAKE UP AND SMELL THE COFFEE!!

    BLOSHIS ANYONE?

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