Violence and political murder were hallmarks of the early years of the Hashimite (also seen as Hashemite) Kingdom. Hussein was present and was himself a target when his grandfather, King Abdullah ibn Hussein Al Hashimi, was shot to death in Jerusalem in 1951. Two prime ministers were murdered, one in 1960 and the other in 1971. As of 1989, Hussein had survived at least nine attempted assassinations that could be documented; numerous other plots had been rumored but denied by the Jordanian authorities. The monarchy was beset by attempts at subversion, conspiracy, and assassination and by smoldering tensions in many parts of the society. The principal sources of these threats to overthrow or discredit Hashimite rule were Arab militants openly hostile to the king’s position as a pro-Western moderate in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hussein’s pragmatic change of attitude in the late 1970s, when he joined other Arab states in rejecting the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, ended his estrangement and diminished Arab hostility to his regime. Since that time, the internal security risk has assumed two forms–leftist, anti-Hashimite factions of the PLO and extremist groups associated with the Islamic revival. Most of these movements were small and scattered and, as of 1989, appeared to be effectively controlled and contained by the efficient Jordanian security apparatus (see General Intelligence Department , this ch.).
Military support was so integral to the monarchy that the stability of the regime was assumed to be in no danger unless the armed forces themselves were to be subverted. Although episodes of discontent over conditions of service had occurred from time to time, the bedouin-dominated army as a whole was one of the most stable institutions in the kingdom. The only open insurrection in the army occurred early in Hussein’s reign, in 1957, when a group calling itself the Free Officers (possibly in imitation of the Egyptian 1952 movement by that name) attempted to wrest the throne from the king. The loyalty of most officers and enlisted personnel, together with Hussein’s own decisive action, defeated the plot and ushered in much stricter security precautions (see Hussein’s Early Reign , ch. 1). The last known conspiracy to involve military personnel occurred in 1972 when 300 army and civilian personnel were arrested after Palestinian militants bribed the acting commander of an armored car unit to stage a coup d’état.
The Islamic revival was growing in strength in Jordan as in other Arab countries but, as a security problem, appeared to be under control as of 1989. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most important of the politico-religious movements, had appeared in Jordan as early as 1946. It was officially recognized by the government and had rights of expression denied to other groups. It was believed to have many thousands of members as of 1988, enjoying the support of perhaps 10 percent of the population. The Muslim Brotherhood had gained a foothold in certain government ministries and was also believed to have insinuated itself into the police and intelligence organizations. Proselytizing had occurred in the armed forces. Although hitherto not a source of antigovernment protests and disturbances (as in Egypt and elsewhere), the Muslim Brotherhood had adopted an increasingly activist and critical tone in its pronouncements by the mid-1980s. Other, more militant, Islamic groups remained small and fragmented. Jordanians were uncertain of the potential danger of the Islamic movement to the stability of the monarchy and whether its adherents might make a bid for power should the regime falter.
In late 1985, the government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood as a warning against its growing stridency and political involvement. The action was also linked to Hussein’s efforts to normalize relations with Syria. Syrian members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been forced to flee to camps in Jordan were accused by the king of subversion aimed against the Damascus government. They were rounded up and extradited to Syria. A new law enacted in the same year prohibited political incitement and accusations by imams and speakers in the mosques. The Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs was designated to review Friday sermons and religious education in the mosques.
data as of 1989
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Knowing of the above the idiot British Politicians allow then into Britain – Then give them jobs within the establishment-I guess that proves the fifth column in not a conspiracy theory-Would Churchill have employed the Nazis in Whitehall—or even welcomed them into the UK at all…………
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